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The Union Walks in the Sixth:
The Integrity of Mandatory
Non-Binding Grievance Procedures
in Collective Bargaining Agreements
AT&T v. Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO'
I. INTRODUCTION
There are many mechanisms short of industrial action which labor unions and
employers use to resolve disputes. Anticipating conflict, but aiming to avoid
industrial action, the two parties might place an arbitration agreement or other
mandatory grievance adjustment procedure into their collective bargaining
agreement. This agreement will reflect the parties' understanding as to how
disputes are to be resolved. This Note examines the limited circumstances in
which the federal courts will enjoin union protest activity carried out in violation
of a collective bargaining agreement's provisions regarding dispute resolution. It
focuses on the analytic inconsistency of the judicial refusal to enjoin union
activities carried out in violation of a collective bargaining agreement during the
pendency of a mandatory dispute resolution procedure other than arbitration.
I.

FACTS AND HOLDING

This case arises out of a labor subcontracting dispute between the
Communication Workers of America, AFL-CIO ("Union") and the American
Telegraph and Telephone Company ("AT&T"). 2 The Union appealed an order of
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio enjoining certain
union protest activities.3 The dispute involved a decision by AT&T to subcontract
certain line work to another company which the Union claimed was reserved for
AT&T employees under the parties' "Operations" collective bargaining
agreement.4
In compliance with the bargaining agreement, the Union filed a grievance
with AT&T. 5 Under the terms of the agreement subcontracting disputes were to
be handled pursuant to a specified non-binding grievance procedure. 6 The
procedure mandated a series of meetings between Union and AT&T
representatives, of increasing authority, with the goal of negotiating a voluntary

1.
2.
3.
4.

985 F.2d 855 (6th Cir. 1993).
Id at 856.
Id. at 857.
Id. at 856.

5.

Id. at 857.

6.

Id. at 856-57.
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resolution.7 After filing its grievance the Union undertook additional protest
activities which included hand-billing, informational picketing at various locations,
and indirect pressure on a company used by AT&T for package delivery.'
AT&T filed suit in district court seeking a temporary restraining order and
a preliminary injunction to prevent the Union from continuing its protest
activities. 9 Finding that the Union had violated the terms of the collective
bargaining agreement by attempting resolution of the dispute by means other than
those provided for in the collective bargaining agreement, the district court granted
the restraining order and preliminary injunction.'0
The Union claimed the preliminary injunction violated the anti-injunction
provision of the Norris-LaGuardia Act." This provision precludes district courts
from enjoining "any person or persons participating or interested in [a labor]
dispute ...from ...[g]iving publicity to the existence of, or the facts involved
in, any labor dispute, whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling, or by any other
method not involving fraud or violence."' 2
The district court found the injunction proper under an exception to the
Norris-LaGuardia Act recognized by the Supreme Court in Boys Markets, Inc. v.
Retail Clerks Union. 3 The Boys Markets Court held that an exception to the
Norris-LaGuardia Act exists "in situations where the labor dispute is subject to 'a
mandatory grievance adjustment or arbitration procedure.""' 4 Relying on this
language, the district court interpreted the words "grievance adjustment" as
mandating the application of the Boys Markets exception to grievance procedures
similar to those in the instant case."5
The court of appeals perceived a conflict between the district court's decision
and the "policy" behind the Boys Markets decision "that the exception only
[applies] when the dispute is subject to arbitration before an impartial third
party.""6 It also perceived a conflict between the district court's decision and the
"central purpose" of the Norris-LaGuardia Act to "foster the growth and viability

7. Id at 857. The agreement also stated that its non-binding grievance provisions "provide the
mutually agreed upon and exclusive forums for resolution and settlement of employee disputes during
the term of th[e] Agreement." The agreement further provided that "[n]either the Company, nor the

Union, its locals or representatives will attempt by means other than the grievance, arbitration, and/or
mediation procedures to bring about the resolution of any issue which is properly a subject for
disposition through such procedures." Id.
8. Id Early in the dispute, the Union voluntarily ceased picketing the facilities of Radio Shack,
an AT&T customer for whom the disputed work was subcontracted. It was alleged that the Union
violated the secondary boycotts prohibition of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §
158(b)(4)(ii)(B). Id.at 857 n.l.
9. Id at 857.
10. Id
11. Id at 856.
12. Id (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1932)).
13. 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
14. AT&T, 985 F.2d at 856 (quoting Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 235).
15. Id at 858.
16. Id
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of labor organizations..'. Pointing out that the Boys Markets decision involved
a grievance provision that provided for mandatory arbitration and not, as in the

instant case, the submission of disputes to non-binding negotiation, the court of
appeals reversed.' The case was remanded to the district court with instructions
to vacate the preliminary injunction. 9
HI. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In the history of American labor relations, federal courts have not always

been neutral forums for the resolution of disputes between workers and

employers.20 In the early decades of this century the federal judiciary was
generally hostile to the interests of the labor movement.2 Management could

generally rely on this hostility when seeking injunctions, often sweeping in scope,
to enforce 3"yellow-dog" labor contracts,'
2
with labor.

and other such devices, in disputes

It was this biased intervention of the federal courts on behalf of employers
that Congress addressed in passing the Norris-LaGuardia Act in 1932.24 Section
4 of the Act specifically denied the federal courts jurisdiction to enter injunctions

preventing labor from undertaking any non-fraudulent, non-violent actions in cases
arising out of labor disputes.25 The legislation effectuated a federal labor policy

17. Id
18. Id. at 860.
19. Id
20. See generallyCatherine A. Vance, Secondary Picketing in Railway LaborDisputes:A Right
Preserved Under the Norris-LaGuardiaAct, 55 FORDHAM L. REv., 203, 216-21 (1986); Arthur S.
Leonard, Specific Perfornancein Collective BargainingAgreements,52 FORDHtAM L. REV. 193 (1983).
The nature of the federal court activities that contributed to the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
is also discussed in Boys Markets, 399 U.S. at 250.
21. See Vance, supra note 20; Leonard, supra note 20.
22. A "yellow dog" contract was described in a Senate Report on the Norris-LaGuardia Act as:
[O]ne which requires the employee, as a condition of obtaining employment, to agree that
he will not join a union while he is in such employment, or, that if he is then a member
of a union, he will disassociate himself ... from it; that he will not quit [sic] without
giving to his employer notice sufficient to enable to the employer to hire some one to take
his place. Such contracts frequently require the employee to agree in advance to accept
such conditions of labor, hours of labor, etc., as may from time to time be decided upon
by his employer .... In all of them the employee waives his right of free association
and genuine representation in connection with his wages, the hours of labor and other
conditions of employment. In other words, he surrenders his actual liberty of contract and
to a great extent he enters into involuntary servitude.
S. REP. No. 163, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1932) (quoted in Vance, supra note 20, at 217 n.83).
23. See Vance, supra note 20; Leonard, supra note 20.
24. Id.
25. Section 4 reads:
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or
temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of any labor
dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or interested in such dispute (as
these terms are herein defined) from ... [c]easing or refusing to perform any work or to
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which broadly aimed to protect the nascent labor movement by prohibiting the
federal courts from using injunctive relief to enforce unconscionable labor

agreements and practices.26

If the yellow-dog labor contract was the symbol of industry power operating
until the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the collective bargaining agreement
represents the more balanced relationship between workers and employers that has
since emerged. The product of comprehensive negotiation, a collective bargaining
contract typically encompasses a host of agreements which govern employerworker relations in a variety of settings, and often anticipates the resolution of
future disputes.
Partly to effectuate this more peaceable expression of labor-employer
relations, Congress passed the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947.27 Section 301 of the
Taft-Hartley Act grants the federal courts' jurisdiction to settle disputes in which
one party acts in violation of a collective bargaining agreement.28
But do the federal courts have jurisdiction to enjoin a labor union from
undertaking protest activities in violation of a collective bargaining agreement
which provides for dispute resolution through other means, such as arbitration or
a structured mediation? Although not expressly mentioning injunctive relief,
Section 301 of Taft-Hartley suggests that federal courts have this jurisdiction by
broadly bestowing jurisdiction to hear "[s]uits for violation of contracts between
29
an employer and a labor organization representing employees in industry." The
injunction issuing
Norris-LaGuardia Act, on the other hand, expressly forbids an
30
in "any case involving or growing out of any labor dispute."
The conflict between Taft-Hartley and the Norris-LaGuardia Act came to a
Under Sinclair, the Norris-LaGuardia Act's
head in Sinclair v. Atkinson. 3
prohibition of federal courts issuing injunctions, in cases arising out of labor
disputes, was interpreted to also proscribe injunctions which would seemingly
otherwise be permissible under Taft-Hartley's broad grant of the right to sue in
federal court, in cases where the union carried out its activities in violation of a
collective bargaining agreement. 32 The dispute in Sinclair involved a series of
work stoppages and strikes by the union in plain and deliberate contravention of
a collective bargaining contract which provided for compulsory arbitration of "any

remain in any relation of employment ...[g]iving publicity to the existence of, or the
facts involved in, any labor dispute, whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling, or by
any other method not involving fraud or violence ...[a]dvising, urging, or otherwise
causing or inducing without fraud or violence the acts heretofore specified ....
29 U.S.C. § 103 (1932).
26. Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 250-51.
27. See Leonard, supra note 20, at 208-13.
28. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1947).
29. Id
30. 29 U.S.C. § 103 (1932).
31. 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
at214.
32. Id.
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difference regarding wages, hours or working conditions between the parties."33
In addition, the agreement expressly proscribed slowdowns, strikes or work
stoppages for any reason having to do with the grievance.3 4 The employer
("Sinclair"), claiming there was no adequate remedy at law which would protect
its contractual rights, requested a permanent order enjoining the union from its
activities in violation of the agreement. 3
In an opinion by Justice Black, the Court held that the legislative history of
Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act indicated Congress did not intend, by its
enactment, to overrule the anti-injunction provision of Section 4 of the NorrisLaGuardia Act. 36 Furthermore, injunctions were found unnecessary to make
arbitration successful.37 There was, in the Court's opinion, simply no conflict
between a federal labor policy encouraging the use of arbitration in the resolution
of grievance disputes and a general prohibition of the use of injunctions against
unions.3 Such a prohibition did "not impair the right of an employer to obtain
an order compelling arbitration of any dispute that may have been made arbitrable
by the provisions of an effective collective bargaining agreement."39 By
implication Justice Black also was referring to the availability of other remedies,
presumably breach of contract damages, which apparently, Sinclair was successful
in obtaining from the trial court.4 °
In Boys Markets, the Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice
Brennan, reversed its earlier decision and essentially adopted Brennan's dissent in
Sinclair.41 Boys Markets involved a dispute concerning the use of laborers who
were not members of the union bargaining unit.42 The union and employer were
both parties to a collective bargaining agreement which provided that "all
controversies concerning [the agreement's] interpretation or application should be
resolved by adjustment and arbitration procedures set forth therein ... .,,'3 The
agreement further provided that "during the life of the contract, there should be
'no cessation or stoppage of work, lock-out, picketing or boycotts.. .. '44
The union called
After demanding that
invoke the grievance
bargaining agreement,

a strike and began picketing Boys Markets' premises.45
the work stoppage and picketing cease, and seeking to
and arbitration procedures specified in the collective
Boys Markets sought a temporary restraining order,

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 197.
Id.
Id. at 197-98.
Id. at 205.
Id.
Id. at 214.
Id.
Id. at 198 n.3.
Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 238.
Id. at 239.
Id. at 238.
Id. at 238-39.

45.

Id. at 239.
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preliminary and permanent injunctions, and specific performance of the contractual
arbitration provision in state court.46 After the state court issued a temporary
restraining order, the union removed to federal district court. The district court
concluded that the dispute was subject to arbitration under the collective
bargaining agreement.48 It ordered that the dispute be submitted to arbitration
and enjoined the strike.49 Considering itself bound by the rule of decision in
Sinclair, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, denying Boys Markets'
prayer for injunctive relief" °
In reversing the court of appeals,"' the Supreme Court articulated several
foundations for abandoning its holding in Sinclair. The court determined that
Sinclair represented "a significant departure from [the Court's] otherwise
consistent emphasis upon the congressional policy to promote the peaceful
settlement of labor disputes through arbitration. 5 2 Perceiving a shift in
congressional policy "from protection of the nascent labor movement to the
encouragement of collective bargaining and to administrative techniques for the
of industrial disputes," the Court identified its task as
. . .resolution
accommodating and reconciling older statutes, such as the Norris-LaGuardia Act,
with more recent ones, more consistent with the current federal labor policy. 3
In this regard, the Court found a conflict between its decision in Sinclair,and
its subsequent decision in Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge 735.54 The Court in Avco
held that suits initially brought in state courts to enforce binding arbitration
agreements under Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act were removable pursuant
This decision upholding federal jurisdiction
to 28 U.S.C. Section 1441."
strict enforcement of the provisions of the
with
Sinclair's
potentially conflicted
Norris-LaGuardia Act which denied the federal court's jurisdiction to prevent
unions from promoting their cause in ways possibly inconsistent with arbitration
procedures agreed in a collective bargaining agreement.5 6 In addition, the rule
undercut the authority of state courts, which are not bound by the provisions of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act, to order injunctive relief by providing for removal to
federal courts, who might then be required to dissolve injunctive relief previously
granted by the state courts.5" This, according to the Court, produced "an

46.
47.

Id. at 239-40.
Id. at 240.

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 238.
Id
Id. at 241.
Id. at 251.
Id at 241. Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge 735, 390 U.S. 557 (1968).
Avco, 390 U.S. at 560.
See Id. at 560-61.
See Id at 560-61.
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untenable situation" that called for a reconsideration of Sinclair, or its extension
to the States."
Next, the Court noted that in addition to the enactment of Taft-Hartley and
its decision in Avco, historical changes in American labor relations made strict
enforcement of the anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
inappropriate. Noting the historical context in which the Act was passed, the
Court recognized that federal courts at the time the Act was passed "generally
were regarded as allies of management in its attempt to prevent the organization
and strengthening of labor unions." 9 The Norris-LaGuardia Act, the Court
further recognized, was a response to judicial behavior, attempting to limit the
involvement of the federal courts in labor disputes on behalf of management by
denying them the use of injunctive relief.' The Court, however, noted a change
in congressional policy as the labor movement grew in strength and maturity, from
"protection" of the labor movement to encouraging "techniques" for resolution of
disputes.6 Subsequent legislation, enacted in a different historical context,
sought to effectuate policies seemingly in conflict with those Norris-LaGuardia
was enacted to achieve.62 The Court also recognized the limits of non-injunctive
relief, including contract damages and employee discharge, as remedies for harm
done to an employer by union activities carried on in breach of a collective
bargaining agreement.63
Sinclair clearly undermined the effectiveness of arbitration, a favored
alternative to less peaceable methods of dispute resolution." It was clear to the
Court that unless recourse to injunctive relief was available "employers [would]
be wary of assuming obligations to arbitrate specifically enforceable against them
when no similarly efficacious remedy [was] available to enforce the concomitant
undertaking of the union to refrain from striking."'
In reaching its conclusion, the Court further asserted that its holding was "a
narrow one" and would apply only in situations where the collective bargaining
agreement contained "a mandatory grievance adjustment or arbitration
procedure."" The availability of injunctive relief to enforce compliance with an
arbitration agreement the union voluntarily entered into would not "retard" the
"central purpose of the Norris-LaGuardia Act to foster the growth and viability of
labor organizations."67 Such a remedial device merely enforced compliance with
an obligation the union freely undertook.6"

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 249 n.18.
Id. at 250.
Id.at 251.
Id
Id.at 251-52.
Id.at 248.
Id. at 252.
Id.at 252.
Id at 253.
Id. at 252-53.
Id. at 252.
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In subsequent cases, the Court has demonstrated that the Boys Markets
exception is indeed narrow by issuing a no strike injunction only when there is a
breach of an agreement to arbitrate, not merely the breach of a no strike provision
in the absence of an agreement to arbitrate.69 Thus, the Court has refused to
enjoin sympathy strikes ° and politically motivated refusals to work7 in breach
of no strike provisions of collective bargaining agreements in the absence of the
breach of an express mandatory arbitration provision in the labor contract.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
This emphasis upon arbitration agreements when requested to enter injunctive
relief, to the exclusion of other contract provisions, including other methods of
dispute resolution, is apparent in AT&T. Under the bargaining agreement between
AT&T and its communications union, subcontracting disputes were to be handled
pursuant to non-binding grievance procedures which called for meetings between
employer and union leaders of escalating seniority. 2 The agreement expressly
forbade the company and the union or their representatives from attempting "by
means other than the grievance... procedures to bring about the resolution of any
issue . . . properly a subject for disposition through such procedures."73 By
undertaking hand billing and "informational" picketing, the Union was arguably
attempting to resolve the dispute by means other than those specified in the
agreement, thereby violating the contract. 4 Thus, in requesting an injunction
prohibiting the Union from undertaking these extra-contractual activities, AT&T
arguably was within its contract rights.75
The court, however, emphasized the narrowness of the Boys Markets
exception." Quoting language from the Boys Markets opinion that the Supreme
Court was dealing "only with the situation in which a collective-bargaining
contract contains a mandatory grievance adjustment or arbitration procedure,"7
Chief Judge Merritt reasoned that it was unclear whether the phrase "mandatory
grievance adjustment" referred to "the kind of grievance procedures agreed to by
"[A]ny suggestion," he wrote, "that grievance
AT&T and the Union."7 8
procedures short of arbitration are also within the exception would be dicta, and
beyond the intended scope of the 'narrow' [Boys Markets] opinion. '' 1' Implying

69.
70.
71.
Terminals

See Leonard, supra note. 20, at 201 n.51-53 and accompanying text.
Id; Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steel Workers, 428 U.S. 397, 406-09 (1976).
See Leonard, supra note 20, at 201 n. 51-53 and accompanying text; Jacksonville Bulk
v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 457 U.S. 702, 723-24 (1982).

72.

AT&T, 985 F. 2d at 856-57.

73.
74.

Id. at 857.
See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.

75.

Id.

76.

AT&T,

77.

Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 253.

78.

AT&T,

79.

Id

985 F.2d at 858.
985 F.2d at 858.
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that the non-enjoinability of secondary activities occurring in violation of the
collective bargaining agreement was in fact a bargained for aspect of the collective
bargaining agreement, the court pointed out that the non-binding procedures such
as those agreed to in the collective bargaining agreement "allow a party the
discretion to turn the negotiations into a meaningless exercise by refusing to reach
an agreement."'0 In addition, the court indicated its concern about "[tlhe danger
that AT&T could use the grievance process to delay meaningful union action." s
Allowing such a tactic conflicts with the purpose of the Norris-LaGuardia Act to
prevent courts from depriving unions of the means of pressing a claim. s2
The court of appeals also discussed Teamsters v. Yellow Transit Freight
Lines,83 decided after Sinclair but before Boys Markets, in which the Supreme
Court disallowed a no strike injunction that it held violated the Norris-LaGuardia
Act." The labor dispute in Yellow Transit was subject to negotiation procedures
similar to those in the collective bargaining agreement at issue in the present
case."5 The court in AT&T pointed out that Justice Brennan, who's dissent in
Sinclair later became the basis of the Boys Markets opinion, concurred in Yellow
Transit.8 6 The court further noted that the concurrence in Yellow Transit was
consistent with Boys Markets, because it was "clear" to Justice Brennan that the
collective bargaining agreement at issue did not bind either party to arbitration."
"Although Justice Brennan's concurrence in Yellow Transit is not binding
precedent," wrote Judge Merritt, "under the circumstances it is very persuasive"
[because Justice Brennan was the author of the Boys Markets decision]."8
According to this reasoning, "[i]f the grievance procedures at issue in Yellow
Transit were not sufficiently similar to arbitration to justify an exception to the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, neither are the grievance procedures at issue here." 89
V. COMMENT
There is an apparent need for the Supreme Court to more completely
harmonize the conflict between the Taft-Hartley Act's grant of jurisdiction to
resolve collective bargaining disputes and the Norris-LaGuardia Act's antiinjunction provision that effectively denies them the authority to do so, outside the
"narrow" arbitration exception created in the Boys Markets decision. Some
attempt has been made to find the conflict illusory by examining the legislative

80.
81.
82.

Id.
Id. at 859.
Id

83.

370 U.S. 711 (1962).

84.
85.

Id.

86.

Id. at 712 (Brennan, J., concurring).
AT&T, 985 F.2d at 859.

87.

Id. See Yellow Transit, 370 U.S. at 711-12.

88.

AT&T, 985 F.2d at 859.

89.

Id.
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history of the two acts." Another approach has been to suggest statutory
amendment of the Norris-LaGuardia Act to allow broader use of an injunction to
enforce a no-strike type of provision within a collective bargaining agreement. 9'
Perhaps the best solution is a legislative one. This section of the Note,. however,
will focus on the analytic inconsistency of the judicial refusal to expand on the
reasoning operative in Boys Markets to enjoin union activities carried out in
violation of a collective bargaining agreement during the pendency of a dispute
resolution mechanism other than arbitration.
Even though Justice Brennan's concurrence in Yellow Transit indicates an
approach hostile to injunctions of union activity in the absence of an agreement
to arbitrate,' as the court of appeals acknowledges, the district court's decision
granting the injunction rests on language actually used in the Boys Markets
decision.93
In expounding the effect of the Court's holding in Boys Markets, Justice
Brennan explained: "Our holding in the present case is a narrow one... [w]e deal
only with the situation in which a collective-bargaining contract contains a
mandatory grievanceadjustment or arbitration procedure."94 This language seems
to contemplate the use of injunctions in situations such as the present case, where
there is a "mandatory grievance adjustment" procedure coupled with a no-strike
provision. In particular, the agreement called for mandatory non-binding
negotiation between union and management officials of progressively escalating
authority and contained a reciprocal promise to not resolve the dispute outside this
procedure. 95
Whatever the meaning to be attached to "mandatory grievance adjustment,"
the sanctioning of injunctive relief in this situation would be consistent with the
"shift" in congressional policy noted by the Court in Boys Markets "from
protection of the nascent labor movement to the encouragement of collective
bargaining and to administrative techniques for the peaceful resolution of industrial
disputes."96 Given the Court's reliance on this policy shift in providing guidance
for its self-acknowledged task of accommodating and reconciling older statutes
with more recent ones, for example Norris-LaGuardia and Taft-Hartley,97 there
has been no adequate explanation as to why it should not apply with equal efficacy
to mandatory procedures other than arbitration.
Both the Sinclair and Boys Markets decisions acknowledged the historical
context in which the Norris-LaGuardia Act was adopted and that it was primarily

90. See Leonard, supra note .20 at 205-06.
91. See Michael A. Berenson, Labor Injunctions Pending Arbitration: A Proposalto Amend
Norris-LaGuardia,63 TUL. L. REV. 1681, 1698-1700 (1989).
92. See supra notes 83-89 and accompanying text.
93. AT&T, 985 F.2d at 858.
94. Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 253 (emphasis added).
95. AT&T, 985 F.2d at 856-57.
96. Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 251.

97.

Id
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intended to encourage and protect a week and youthful labor movement from
judicial hostility." While it is appropriate to deny federal courts the power to
enjoin labor protest activities in violation of a "yellow dog" labor contract, where
there was little pretense as to equality of bargaining power, it seems inappropriate
to deny such relief when protests are conducted in violation of a collective
bargaining agreement that was freely entered into and comprehensively negotiated
by the union on terms of relative parity with management.
As is the case with any arbitration provision agreed to in a collective
bargaining agreement, a mandatory non-binding negotiation procedure and a
commitment to refrain from protest activities during its pendency, is bargained for
by both parties. Unless such a procedure is understood from the beginning as a
farce, in which case it is superfluous, it represents the parties' expectations about
how disputes are to be resolved. If such procedures are to have any integrity, then
federal courts should be allowed to effectuate them through the use of injunctive
relief as allowed under Boys Markets. While it is true that an agreement to
arbitrate, unlike an agreement to negotiate, will necessarily result in a final
resolution of the dispute, it does not necessarily follow that the process is a
"meaningless exercise," though the parties do have the discretion to turn it into
one."
It seems questionable whether concern that management will abuse the
non-binding grievance procedures to delay meaningful union action justifies strict
adherence to the broad language of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.Ico It is just this
sort of opportunistic behavior, on the part of management or a union, that
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms are designed to overcome. They allow
the parties to anticipate disputes, create an appropriate process for resolving them,
and then attempt to arrive at a mutually satisfactory solution.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is analytically consistent with Boys Markets to allow the federal courts
jurisdiction to enjoin union protest activities carried out in violation of a collective
bargaining agreement, even in the absence of an agreement to arbitrate. If the
parties to a collective bargaining agreement are to be free to order the nature of
their relationship in agreements that have integrity, it does not make sense to treat
violation of non-binding mandatory grievance adjustment procedures differently
from violations where the agreement happens to contain an arbitration clause. A
regime that denies the federal courts jurisdiction to effectuate such agreements
promotes continued adherence to an industrial policy forged in a different
historical context to remedy a different set of problems than those presented.
MARK RILEY KROEKER

98. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
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